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FOURTH AMENDMENT-LIMITED
LUGGAGE SEIZURES VALID ON
REASONABLE SUSPICION
United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years after its landmark decision in Tery v. Ohio,' the
United States Supreme Court extended the scope of the Terry doctrine
to include seizures of personal property in United States v. Place.2 The
Court held that when law enforcement officers reasonably suspect,
based on their observations, that a traveler is carrying luggage containing narcotics, they may conduct a properly limited investigative detention of the luggage. In Place, however, the ninety-minute seizure
exceeded permissible bounds and therefore was unreasonable. 3 The
Court concluded that some brief, warrantless detentions of luggage
based only on reasonable suspicion do not violate the fourth amendment 4 because the government interest in curbing narcotics trafficking,
coupled with the attendant enforcement problems, outweighs the minimal intrusion on an individual's protected interests. 5 In addition, the
Court held that the exposure of Place's luggage, located in a public
place, to a "canine sniff" for investigatory purposes did not constitute a
1 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Tny Court held that where police officers observe unusual
conduct that leads them to conclude, in light of their experience, that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the suspect may be armed and presently dangerous, they may investigate
this behavior. If, after identifying themselves as police officers and making reasonable inquiries, nothing in the initial encounter dispels their reasonable fear for their own or others'
safety, they are entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of the suspect's outer clothing in
an attempt to discover weapons that might be used to assault them or others in the area. Id.
at 30.

2 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
3 Id. at 2639.

4 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5 The fourth amendment protects both "the interest in retaining possession of property
and the interest in maintaining personal privacy." Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1546
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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"search" under the fourth amendment. 6
This Note argues that the Court's decision to apply the Terry "reasonable suspicion" standard in the property context is justified, albeit
unnecessary to the resolution of Place. Seizures of property, like those of
persons, can vary in nature and extent; therefore, the Court appropriately applied the Terry balancing test to airport detentions of luggage
that constitute less than full-scale seizures.
The Court's discussion of the "canine sniff" of Place's luggage was
also unnecessary to the outcome. While its decision arguably is supportable, the Court should have refrained from removing "canine sniffs" of
property in public places from the purview of the fourth amendment
until it could formulate a better informed analysis of this complex issue.
II.

FACTS OF PLACE

Because Raymond Place's behavior aroused the suspicions of two
law enforcement officers, 7 they approached Place as he waited in line at
the Miami International Airport and asked for and received identification.8 Place agreed to let the agents search the two suitcases he had
checked, but the officers decided against the search because Place's
flight to New York was ready to depart; however, his parting comment
that he had recognized that they were police rekindled their suspicions. 9
After further inquiry, 10 the officers relayed the information concerning
Place to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials in New
York.
Shortly after Place arrived at LaGuardia Airport, two DEA agents
approached him, informed him that they believed he might be transporting narcotics," and took his driver's license and airline ticket re6 103 S. Ct. at 2645.
7 The officers based their suspicions on the following facts: Place was departing from a
"source city" and paid for his ticket in cash; he systematically scanned the lobby area while
waiting in line and turned and looked over his shoulder while purchasing his ticket; he stared
directly at the officers two or three times, paying particularly close attention to one of them
after leaving the line; and, he began walking toward the departure gate, stopped for no apparent reason, turned around and headed back to the lobby area, and walked in a full circle,
looking back continuously to see whether he was being followed. United States v. Place, 498
F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), revId, 660 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1981), afd, 103 S.Ct. 2637
(1983).
8 United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2639-40 (1983).
9 Id.

at 2640.

1o The officers discovered a discrepancy between the address tags on Place's two checked
suitcases. Local police in the town listed on the luggage tags informed the officers that neither
address existed and that the telephone number Place had given the airline was that of a third
address on the same street. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 45-46 (2d Cir. 198 1),affad, 103
S.Ct. 2637 (1983).
11 103 S. Ct. at 2640. The DEA agents in New York claimed that the following facts, in
addition to those relied upon by the officers in Miami, justified the LaGuardia stop: Place
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ceipt. 12 After Place refused to consent to a search of his suitcases, one of
the DEA agents responded that they were going to take the luggage to
try to obtain a search warrant from a federal judge. Place declined the
agents' invitation to accompany them.
The agents then transported both suitcases to Kennedy Airport
where a trained narcotics detection dog performed a "sniff test." Approximately ninety minutes after the luggage had been seized, the dog
reacted positively to the smaller suitcase. After obtaining a search warrant, DEA agents opened the suitcase, discovering 1,125 grams of
cocaine. 13
Indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver,' 4 Place
moved in the district court to suppress the cocaine discovered during the
search because he claimed his fourth amendment rights were violated by
the warrantless seizure of his luggage. 15 The district court denied his
motion, relying on United States v. Van Leeuwen to justify applying TerrY
6
standards to the detention of physical items.'
broke into a sweat when questioned in Miami, and he remarked that he had recognized the
officers as police; Place's baggage tags listed different addresses, neither of which were believed to exist; Place scanned the area at LaGuardia Airport and appeared nervous; and, he
told the agents that he knew that they were "cops." United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. at
1225-26.
Place displayed many of the traits listed in the "drug courier profile," a compilation of
characteristics common to those engaged in narcotics trafficking. The DEA developed the
profile in 1974 to provide its agents with guidelines for spotting couriers. Frequently found
characteristics include: travel between major "source" and "use" cities; rapid turnaround
times; travel with little or no luggage; departure from the plane either first or last; nervousness; use of an alias; and payment in cash. "Secondary" characteristics include: an almost
exclusive use of public transportation to leave the airport; a telephone call immediately upon
arrival; use of a fictitious callback number; and excessively frequent travel to "source" and
"use" cities. Greene & Wice, The D.E.A. Drug CourierPrqfle: Histoy and Analysi, 22 S. TEX.
LJ. 261, 269-73 (1982).
12 103 S. Ct. at 2640. A later DEA computer check on Place's driver's license revealed no
prior offenses. Id.
13 Id.
14 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841

(a)(1) (1981), prohibits any person from knowingly or intentionally manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.
15 498 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Place also argued that his detentions at the airports in Miami and New York were not grounded on reasonable suspicion and that the "sniff
test" was administered in a manner calculated to achieve a tainted reaction from the dog. Id.
at 1221, 1228. The district court rejected both arguments. Id. at 1225, 1228. Reserving his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, Place then pleaded guilty and was convicted. United States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 45.
16 United States v. Place, 498 F.Supp. at 1226-27. The district court asserted that United
States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970), "extended the Terry logic to the detention of
parcels of mail believed to contain contraband." 498 F. Supp. at 1226. In Van Leguwen, the
defendant mailed two packages under circumstances that aroused the suspicion of postal employees. Postal agents detained the packages for approximately 29 hours while customs officials obtained information about the addresses listed on the packages. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that
the removal and ninety-minute detention of Place's luggage before the
dog sniff established probable cause violated his fourth amendment
rights because the seizure of the suitcases could not reasonably be characterized as a permissible Teny-type investigative stop. 1 7 Although deciding the case under Terry standards, the court criticized the lower
court's reading of Van Leeuwen to expand the scope of the Terry doctrine
to include seizures of property.1 8 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the fourth amendment prohibits law enforcement officers from briefly seizing luggage, reasonably suspected of containing narcotics, for the purpose of subjecting it to a "sniff
test" by a trained narcotics detection dog. 19
III.

DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Because the prolonged seizure of Place's suitcases violated his
fourth amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court, per Justice
O'Connor, unanimously affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of
Place's conviction.20 The Court also held that the principles of Terry v.
at 249. Because this information established probable cause, a United States commissioner
issued a search warrant. Finding counterfeit coins when they opened the packages, the authorities resealed the packages and sent them to their destinations. Id. at 250. The Supreme
Court held that because of the nature, suspicious character, and different destinations of the
packages, the unavoidable delay in contacting the farthest destination, and the distance between the commissioner's office and the post office, "a 29-hour delay between the mailings
and the service of the warrant cannot be said to be 'unreasonable' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 253.
17 660 F.2d at 52. Unless the DEA agents' actions fell within an exception to the requirements of the Warrant Clause, "the warrantless seizure of Place's baggage without probable
cause would clearly violate the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 50.
18 After noting the argument that Terry standards should not apply to the detention of
personal property because property cannot resume its course independently after being detained as a person can, the court remarked that "for present purposes, in addition to assuming
without deciding that an investigative stop was justified, we are willing also to apply the
principles of Terry to seizures of property." Id. at 50. Contra Comment, Seizing Luggage on Less
than Probable Cause, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 637 (1981).
The appellate court claimed, however, that the district court's reliance on Van Leeuwen
was "misplaced." 660 F.2d at 52. The court distinguished Van Leeuwen in four major respects:
(1) the owner of the packages voluntarily gave up their custody and control during the time
required for mail delivery; (2) the postal agents already had lawful custody of the parcels
when they decided to detain them; (3) mere detention of mail not in the owner's control is no
personal deprivation and produces, at most, a technical interference with one's person or
effects; and (4) the Van Leeuwen Court only held that the short detention of mail was reasonable under the facts of the case. Id. at 52-53.
19 457 U.S. 1104 (1982). The Supreme Court also denied certiorari to Place's cross-petition on the issue of reasonable suspicion. 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
20 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). Adhering to the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," the
Court disallowed the cocaine as evidence even though the DEA agents confiscated it pursuant
to a search warrant founded upon probable cause. Because probable cause was established
only as a result of the luggage detention and subsequent "canine sniff," the cocaine bore the
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and its progeny 22 permit law enforcement authorities to detain
personal luggage briefly for the purpose of pursuing a properly limited
investigation based on reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains
narcotics. 23 In addition, the Court held that the exposure of Place's luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog did not constitute a "search"
24
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
The Court began its discussion by acknowledging that the seizure
of personal property is generally considered per se unreasonable under
the fourth amendment unless authorized by a judicial warrant issued
upon a showing of probable cause. 25 Where exigent circumstances exist
26
or another recognized exception to the warrant requirement is present,
however, the Court permits warrantless seizures of containers if law enOhio21

taint of the unlawful seizure and therefore was inadmissible. See generallv Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
21 392 U.S. I (1968). In Ten,, the Supreme Court approved a "stop and frisk" for weapons when the officer reasonably suspected that he was dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual. Id. at 30. Prior to Teny, the "reasonableness" requirement of the fourth amendment in the criminal context was synonymous with the "probable cause" requirement of the
fourth amendment's Warrant Clause. Terry was the first case to recognize the authority of
law enforcement officials to conduct "stop and frisks" based only on reasonable suspicion, a
lesser standard than probable cause. Id.
22 Several cases followed Terr,, all purporting to carefully maintain its narrow scope. See,
eg., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (officer justified in ordering traffic law
offender to step out of car and in frisking him because of a "bulge" in his jacket); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (although evidence was insufficient to justify
the stop at issue, roving border patrols may stop and question motorists briefly about their
citizenship based on reasonable suspicion that they are illegal aliens); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk upheld on the basis of an informant's tip).
The Supreme Court has also applied Ten, principles in the context of narcotics violations. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (because special law enforcement
interests outweigh the minimal additional intrusion resulting from detention in one's home
while the police execute a valid search warrant, police may detain occupants of the premises
without probable cause); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (Powell, J., concurring) (three Justices found that the questioning of the defendant
at an airport about possible drug smuggling constituted a valid Teny-type investigative
seizure).
The Supreme Court, however, has refused to apply Teny to validate police conduct
which approximates a full-scale search or seizure. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1977) (because Tery principles apply only to government actions less intrusive than fullscale seizures, custodial interrogation of suspect at police station required probable cause because it was indistinguishable from traditional arrest).
23 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
24 Id at 2644-45. Technically, the Court's statements relating to the seizure of luggageper
se and to the "canine sniff" constitute dicta because their discussion was unnecessary to the
disposition of the case.
25 Id. at 2641;see, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
26 The Supreme Court has dispensed with the warrant requirement for searches and
seizures of persons and property in several situations: searches incident to a lawful arrest, see,
e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); automobile searches and seizures, see, e.g.,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); plain view seizures, see, e.g., Ker v. California,
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forcement authorities have probable cause to believe that the container
conceals contraband or evidence of a crime. 27 Under Terry, police officers may make limited investigatory seizures of persons based on less
than probable cause if sufficient opposing law enforcement interests exist. The Court balances the competing interests to determine whether
28
the seizure is reasonable.
Applying the balancing test to seizures of property, the Court first
assessed the substantiality of the law enforcement interests. 2 9 Because
"[tlhe public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would
traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit, '30 and because police face
unique difficulties in detecting drug traffickers, 31 the Court found the
32
government interest to be strong.
Against this substantial government interest, the Court balanced
the impact of the intrusion on an individual's fourth amendment interests when luggage is detained for investigative purposes. 33 Rejecting
374 U.S. 23 (1963); and, searches and seizures made in hot pursuit, see, e.g., United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
In a few narrowly defined situations, warrantless searches and seizures require no degree
of suspicion as justification: consent searches, see, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489
(1964) (suspect waives his fourth amendment rights); administrative searches in highly regulated industries, see, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (owner impliedly consents by entering highly regulated business); and, searches at the border or its functional
equivalent, see, e.g., United States v. Ramsay, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977) (fourth amendment does not apply at all at the border). As the latter examples indicate, none of the situations involve involuntary searches and seizures that implicate recognized fourth amendment
interests in a criminal context.
27 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
28 103 S. Ct. at 2642.
29 Id. at 2643. The Court rejected Place's contention that only special law enforcement
interests like officer safety can justify seizures based solely on reasonable suspicion:
In Terg, we described the governmental interests supporting the initial seizure of the
person as "effective crime prevention and detection . . . " Similarly, in Michigan v.
Summers, we identified three law enforcement interests that justified limited detention of
the occupants of the premises during execution of a valid search warrant: "preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found," "minimizing the risk of harm
both to the officers and the occupants," and "orderly completion of the search." 452
U.S. at 702-703, 101 S. Ct. at 2594.
103 S. Ct. at 2643. The Court emphasized that "[t]he test is whether those [governmental]
interests are sufficiently 'substantial,'. . . not whether they are independent of the interest in
investigating crimes effectively and apprehending suspects." Id.
30 Id. at 2642 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (Powell, J., concurring)).
31 In the words of Justice Powell, "Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted by sophisticated criminal syndicates. The profits are enormous. And many drugs...
may be easily concealed. As a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal conduct may be
unmatched in any other area of law enforcement." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561-62 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
32 103 S. Ct. at 2643.
33 Id.
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Place's contention that there are no degrees of intrusion in the property
context, the Court found the Terry rationale applicable to seizures of
property as well as persons.3 4 Justice O'Connor reasoned that, like intrusions on personal liberty, intrusions on possessory interests can vary in
nature35 and extent; 36 therefore, seizures of property can be charted
along a continuum based on the severity of the intrusion. Thus, the
Court concluded that some detentions of personal effects intrude so minimally on fourth amendment interests that the government interest in
curbing drug trafficking justifies a properly limited investigative seizure
37
based only on reasonable suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics.
Turning its attention to the facts of Place, the Court premised its
discussion on the theory that investigatory detentions of luggage seized
from a suspect's custody should be subject to the same constitutional
limitations as investigatory detentions of the person.38 Justice O'Connor
stressed that seizure of luggage from a suspect's immediate possession
can invade personal liberty interests as well as possessory interests. Although technically remaining free, suspects realistically may have their
plans disrupted by having to arrange for the return of the luggage or
electing to remain with it until the investigation is completed. 3 9 Apply34 Id. at 2643-44. The Tery exception is premised on the notion that there exist varying
degrees of intrusion on personal liberty interests. Because the brief "stop and frisk" is less
intrusive than a formal arrest, the Tery Court reasoned that the general rule requiring probable cause (to render fourth amendment searches and seizures reasonable) could be replaced
by the reasonable suspicion requirement when the balancing test shows a strong governmental interest and a limited intrusion on the individual. To justify applying the Terry doctrine to
seizures of property, the Court in P/ace first had to find that different degrees of intrusion also
exist in the property context. Id. at 2642-44.
35 Id. at 2643. Justice O'Connor emphasized that "[t]he seizure may be made after the
owner has relinquished control of the property to a third party or, as here, from the immediate custody and control of the owner." Id.
To illustrate the point, the Court contrasted the factual situation in Place (seizure from
the owner's custody) with the situation in United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970)
(detention of packages after the owner had relinquished control to the postal authorities).
"'Van Leeuwen was an easy case for the Court because the defendant was unable to show that
the invasion intruded upon either a privacy interest in the contents of the packages or a
possessog interest in the packages themselves.' 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6, p. 60 (1982
Supp.)" Id. at 2643-44 n.6 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 2643. The Court noted that "the police may confine their investigation to an onthe-spot inquiry-for example, immediate exposure of the luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog-or transport the property to another location." Id. at 2643-44.
37 Id. at 2644.
38 Id. at 2645. The Court rejected the government's argument that "the point at which
probable cause for seizure of luggage from the person's presence becomes necessary is more
distant than in the case of a Terry stop of the person himself." Id.
39 Id. Justice O'Connor quoted Professor LaFave, who has suggested that, at least when
the authorities do not inform the suspect of how and when his luggage will be returned,
"seizure of the object is tantamount to seizure of the person .... [The] person must either
remain on the scene or. . .seemingly surrender his effects permanently to the police. 3 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.6 at 61 (1982 Supp.)" The Court did note that "in some cir-
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ing the Terry standards for seizures of persons to the seizure of Place's
luggage, the Court found that the ninety-minute detention alone rendered the investigation unreasonable. 4°
The Court emphasized that the brevity of the invasion is important
in determining whether the intrusion can be justified merely on reasonable suspicion. 4 1 The Court also indicated that the diligence of the officers in pursuing the investigation is relevant in ascertaining whether
the length of the detention is reasonable. 42 In Place, the agents could
have minimized the intrusion on Place's fourth amendment rights by
arranging to have the narcotics detection dog waiting at LaGuardia Airport when Place's flight arrived, but they failed to do so.43 The agents
exacerbated the violation by failing to tell Place where they were taking
his luggage, how long it might be detained, and how it would be returned to him if their investigation proved futile.44
Justice O'Connor also considered whether the "canine sniff' of
Place's luggage constituted a search requiring probable cause. 45 She
emphasized that a "canine sniff" does not require the opening of a suitcase and reveals only the presence or absence of narcotics. Therefore,
unlike a traditional police search, a "canine search" avoids any of the
inconvenience or embarassment to the owner that may result from the
wholesale disclosure of the luggage's contents to public scrutiny. 4 6 Noting that no other investigative procedure is so limited in the manner of
conducting the inquiry and in the content of the information revealed,
cumstances," seizures of property are less intrusive than seizures of the person; id. at 2645;
however, it failed to discuss what might constitute such a "circumstance." See inra notes 12526 and accompanying text.
4 Id.
41 Id. The Court was not willing to approve the ninety-minute seizure of Place's luggage
on less than probable cause primarily because it had never approved a Teny-type stop of a
person for such a prolonged time period; however, the Court also refused to establish an
outside time limitation for a valid investigative stop. d. at 2646. Justice O'Connor believed
that such a limit would undermine the ability of police to gauge their actions to the demands
of each individual situation without concern about compliance with a rigid time frame. Id. at
2646 n.10.
42 Id
at 2645.
43 Id. at 2645-46. If the police had had a dog waiting, they could have saved time and
avoided the intrusion on Place's possessory interests caused by the removal of his luggage to
Kennedy Airport. Id. at 2646 n.9.
44 Id. at 2646.
45 Justice O'Connor considered the "canine sniff" issue because if the "canine sniff" "is
itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of respondent's luggage for the
purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test-no matter how brief-could not be justified on less
than probable cause." Id. at 2644. Place, however, did not contest the validity of "canine
sniffs" in general in the district court, and the court of appeals did not address or decide the
issue. Moreover, neither party briefed nor argued the issue before the Supreme Court. Id. at
2651 (Brennan, J., concurring).
46 Id. at 2644.
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the Court concluded that the "canine sniff" of Place's luggage did not
47
constitute a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who concurred only in the result,
criticized the Court's reliance on Terry to uphold the constitutionality of
luggage seizures based upon reasonable suspicion. 4 Justice Brennan argued that, in addition to being unnecessary to the judgment, the luggage seizure decision finds no support in Terry principles; the Court
departed from settled fourth amendment doctrines and significantly diluted the constitutional protections against government interference
with personal property. 49 Justice Brennan argued that Terry and its
progeny represent narrowly defined exceptions to the probable cause requirement that should only apply to minimally intrusive police actions
justified by special concerns like safety. These exceptions should not be
employed to validate the use of any investigative technique that law
enforcement authorities believe is necessary to combat crime. 50 He suggested that although Terry may validate seizures of property incidental
to seizures of individuals, it does not authorize independent seizures of
personal property upon less than probable cause. 5 1 In addition, Justice
Brennan disapproved of the Court's hasty resolution of the "canine
sniff" issue, claiming that it was unnecessary to the decision and that a
future case could provide the Court with a better opportunity to address
52
the complexities of the issue.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, also concurred only
in the judgment, 53 expressing concern over what he believed to be "an
emerging tendency on the part of the Court to convert the Terry decision
into a general statement that the Fourth Amendment requires only that
any seizure be reasonable. '54 Despite his reservations, Justice Blackmun
conceded that "a limited intrusion caused by a temporary seizure of luggage for investigative purposes couldfall within the Terry exception" be47 Id. at 2644-45.
48 Id. at 2646 (Brennan, J., concurrring). Justice Brennan believed that the Court should
have affirmed on the ground that the protracted detention exceeded the limits of a constitutionally permissible investigatory stop and refrained from any further discussion. Id.
49 Id. at 2648-49.
50 Id. at 2648.
51 Id. at 2649. Justice Brennan distinguished seizures of persons, which interfere with
personal privacy, from seizures of property, which interfere with one's possessory interests,
asserting that Tery is applicable only to the former. Id. According to Justice Brennan, the
police violated Place's constitutional rights "as soon as the officers seized respondent's luggage, independent of their seizure of him ....

"

Id

at 2650.

52 Id. at 2651.
53 Id. at 2651 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun expressed concern with the
Court's opinion in the same two areas addressed by Justice Brennan, although his views differ
somewhat from Justice Brennan's. Id.
54 Id. at 2652.
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cause the interception of drug traffickers in airports is a significant law
enforcement interest.55 He emphasized that "[t]he critical threshold issue is the intrusiveness of the seizure." '56 Justice Blackmun also agreed
with Justice Brennan that because resolution of the "canine sniff" issue
was not necessary to the outcome in Place, the Court should have deferred a decision until it had greater information that would enable it to
57
address adequately the complexities of the issue.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF LUGGAGE UPON REASONABLE
SUSPICION

The most remarkable aspect of the Supreme Court's decision validating seizures of luggage upon less than probable cause is that the
Court did not need to consider the issue at all. The ninety-minute detention of Place's suitcases violated his fourth amendment rights and
thereby tainted the confiscated cocaine, regardless of whether the Court
found the initial luggage seizure justified. Therefore, Justices Brennan
and Blackmun validly criticized the Court for ignoring a judicial convention by unnecessarily deciding a constitutional question. 58
Although it was not compelled to address the issue, the Court cor55 Id. at 2652-53 (emphasis added). Because Justice Marshall joined in both of the concurring opinions, some confusion exists in ascertaining his position. Whereas Justice Brennan
would always invalidate a temporary independent seizure of luggage based upon less than
probable cause, Justice Blackmun indicated that such a practice conceivably could fall within
the T7rrA exception.
56 Id. at 2653. Justice Blackmun disagreed with the Court's view that the diligence of the
police is a relevant factor in ascertaining the extent of the intrusion. In his view, whether the
police conscientiously pursue the investigation does not affect the duration and intrusiveness
of the seizure. Id. at 2653 n.2.
57 Id. at 2653. Justice Blackmun also suggested that a "canine sniff" might fall within the
Terry exception for minimally intrusive searches that can be justified on reasonable suspicion.
See infia notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
58 Id. at 2646 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2651-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Brennan suggested that the Court was "unable to 'resist the pull to decide the constitutional issues involved in this case on a broader basis than the record before [it] imperatively
requires.' "Id. at 2646 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
581 (1969)).
The Supreme Court has developed a set of rules under which it has avoided deciding a
significant number of the constitutional questions presented to it. Justice Rutledge once emphasized that " '[i]f there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality
. . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.'" Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los
Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 570 n.34 (1947) (quoting Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. 101, 105 (1944)). "It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case." Id. (quoting Burton v. United
States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905)); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.
288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing other rules adopted by the Court to
avoid deciding constitutional issues).
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rectly extended the Terry doctrine to seizures of property. The central
inquiry in fourth amendment analysis of police behavior involves the
reasonableness of a particular government invasion into a citizen's protected interests. 5 9 In previous cases, the Court has considered two types
of seizures in determining the justification required to render a specific
seizure reasonable. 60 First, seizures "having the essential attributes of a
formal arrest,. .. [are] unreasonable unless. . . supported by probable
'6 1
cause."
Second, police may conduct certain limited invasions supported by
less than probable cause. 62 In Teny, the Court first recognized a special
category of police behavior so substantially less intrusive than a fullscale search or seizure that a balancing test could replace the strict probable cause requirement in determining whether an invasion is reasonable.6 3 The Court balances the nature and scope of the intrusion
against the substantial government interest served by the invasion.
While a substantial law enforcement interest may justify a limited intrusion, "the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts" warranting a reasonable belief that a suspect presents a threat to
the asserted interest. 64
Before applying the Teny balancing test, the Place Court had to
reach two conclusions: (1) seizures of property can vary in nature and
extent, and (2) limited airport seizures of luggage for investigatory purposes do not approximate full-scale seizures. 65 Place had contended that
the Teny rationale was inapplicable to luggage seizures because all
seizures of property result in a complete and absolute dispossession.66
The Court justifiably rejected Place's argument.
59 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219
(1979) (White, J., concurring) ("The key principle of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness--the balancing of competing interests.').
60 Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1332 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981). In such cases,
the standard of probable cause. . . represented the accumulated wisdom of precedent
and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion
involved in an arrest "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. The standard applied
to all arrests, without the need to "balance" the interests and circumstances involved in
particular situations.
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208. Probable cause exists when there is sufficient evidence to lead a
reasonable and prudent person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed; it does
not require evidence sufficient to convict. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76
(1949).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
63 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208-10.
64 Teny, 392 U.S. at 21.

65 See supra note 34. The Supreme Court addressed both of these issues indirectly, within
the context of applying the Tery balancing test. 103 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
66 103 S. Ct. at 2643.
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Seizures of property, like seizures of persons, can vary in nature and
extent. Police can seize property directly from a suspect's custody 67 or
from third parties having control over the property. 68 They can seize
the property for a few minutes69 or for several hours. 70 Officers can leave
the property where it is 7 1 or move it to a different location. 72 In addition, seizures of property can be either accusatory or investigatory in
nature. Most seizures occur after a search and entail the collection of
evidence. 73 Seizure of property for evidentiary purposes is akin to an
arrest because of its role in the prosecutorial process and its concomitant
accusatory nature.7 4 On the other hand, police conduct investigatory
seizures of property to obtain information that will either support their
suspicions and justify an extended detention based upon probable cause
or dispel their fears and result in the seizure's termination. 75 Therefore,
the Court validly determined that seizures of property, like seizures of
67 United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983) (seizure of luggage carried by defendant).

68 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention of mailed packages by
postal authorities).
69 United States v. Martell, 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981) (20-minute detention ofsuitcases), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3551 (1983).
70 United States v. Regan, 687 F.2d 531 (1st Cir. 1982) (22-hour detention of suitcase).
71 United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1981) (drug detection dog brought to airport), cert. granted,judgment vacatedand remanded, 103 S. Ct. 3528 (1983) (remanded for consideration in light of Place).
72 United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983) (suitcases transported from LaGuardia to
Kennedy Airport).
73 One commentator has noted that
[s]eizure of an item not contemporaneous with a search is the exception rather than the
rule. In fact, with the exception of a "plain view" seizure, a noncontemporaneous seizure
happens only when the item seized is really the place that subsequently will be searched
and from which other items will, in turn, be seized.
Comment, supra note 18, at 645. When a seizure involves the collection of evidence to be used
at trial, controversies that arise usually concern the validity of the search rather than the
seizure. Id.
74 Prosecutors use property seized for evidentiary purposes at trial. Dispossession lasts as
long as the police can utilize the property to incriminate the suspect.
75 In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 164 (1972), the Court held that "[a] brief stop of a
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known
to the officer at the time." In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981), the Court
characterized the purpose underlying a Tery stop as "investigating possible criminal activity." But see Comment, Reformulating Seiaures-AirportDrug Stops and the Fourth Amendment, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1486, 1503 n.101 (1981) (Investigatory seizures, as opposed to nominally investigative information gathering activities, involve collecting data for the potential prosecution of a suspect) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Reformulating Seizures]. Compare Comment,
Fourth Amendment-Airport Searches and Seizures: Where Will the Court Land?, 71 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 499, 511-12 (1980) (Stops aimed at investigating a particular person are more
intrusive than those designed to acquire information because a person stopped might incriminate himself; however, it is difficult to distinguish between purely informational and investigatory stops).
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persons, can be plotted on a sliding scale. 76
Some seizures of luggage entail less than full-scale seizures. For example, without moving the suitcases at all, DEA agents could seize luggage for a few minutes while a trained narcotics detection dog sniffs it
for drugs. Terry and its progeny placed great importance on time and
distance factors in determining whether a particular police action resembled a full-scale search or seizure. In United States v. Bngnoni-Ponce,77

the Court justified seizures of travelers based on reasonable suspicion
because the stops usually lasted no more than a minute. In Dunaway v.
New York ,78 the Court held that a custodial interrogation approximated

a traditional arrest and required probable cause where the police transported the suspect to the police station for questioning. The longer police detain suspects or the farther they transport them, the more closely
a particular category of police behavior resembles a full-scale search or
seizure. Similarly, the longer police hold suitcases or the farther they
move them, the more closely luggage detentions resemble full-scale
seizures.

Moreover, police detain suitcases primarily for investigatory purposes. DEA agents and other law enforcement officers seize luggage at
airports to obtain additional information about possible narcotics trafficking. Because police utilize luggage seizures as investigative tools,
and because they have the ability to limit the time and area involved,
the Court correctly concluded that some luggage seizures constitute less
than full-scale seizures and justify application of the Terry balancing
test.
Applying such a balancing test when police seize luggage directly
from a suspect's custody, the seizure intrudes minimally on fourth
amendment interests. In the past, the Court has analyzed various fac-

tors in assessing the degree of intrusion on a suspect's protected rights.
76 See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 388-94
(1974). In Terry, the Court had faced the argument that "there is not-and cannot be-a
variety of police activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the
citizen and yet which stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make an arrest."
Tery, 392 U.S. at 11. See, e.g., Foote, The FourthAmendment- Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of
Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 402 (1960); Souris, Stop andFriskor Arrest
and Search-The Use ad Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
251 (1966). Also, less than 10 years before Tenry, the Court had found that "[w]hen the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest. . . was
complete." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959). See Note, ConstitutionalLawNotwithstanding an Absence of Probable Cause, a Police Oftwer May Stop, Question, and Pat Down an
Individual Whom He Reasonab4' Believes To Be Engaged in Criminal Activity and Armed. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 47 Tax. L. REv. 138, 140-41 (1968). Therefore, the Court's decision
in Place was no more revolutionary than its adoption of the sliding scale approach toward
seizures of persons in Teny.
77 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975).
78 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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These include the actual physical intrusiveness, the subjective effect of
79
the intrusion, and the police officer's discretion in selecting suspects.
Although the Court has based its decision in various cases on the degree
of psychological intrusion caused by the challenged government action,8 0 occasionally it has avoided addressing the issue directly,8 ' and it
has even upheld police behavior that creates substantial anxiety. 82 To
prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by law enforcement officers, the Court requires articulable suspicion (or probable cause) to
justify intrusions. 83 Therefore, the key variable in assessing the intrusiveness of a search or seizure of effects is the extent of the physical invasion.
Seizures of luggage intrude on fourth amendment interests to no
greater degree than when police seize the suspects instead of their baggage. Luggage detentions may intrude on suspects' possessory interests
in their luggage and their liberty interests in continuing with their travel
plans;8 4 however, Teny-type seizures of persons also may intrude on both
possessory and liberty interests. Tery-type investigative detentions of
the person may entail incidental seizures of personal effects, including
luggage that the suspect might possess. 85 In addition, the Court applied
79 Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusionson Less
Than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 49, 52 (1981).
80 Compare United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of Border Patrol checkpoint stops of traffic) with United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
894 (1975) (roving patrols more likely to frighten travelers than checkpoint stops). In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court emphasized that the
objective intrusion-the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection-also existed in roving-patrol stops. But we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the
subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop.
428 U.S. at 558.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (Court did not note the
great fear and anxiety suspects most likely suffer when police car headlights shine into their
cars at night). Compare Greenberg, supra note 79, at 59 & n.7.
82 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 25 (frisks are severe intrusions upon personal security and
must surely be annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experiences).
83 See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 (reasonable suspicion requirement protects
"residents of the border areas from indiscriminate official interference"); see also Greenberg,
supra note 79, at 52 n.20.
84 103 S. Ct. at 2645. See supra note 39. Commentators have suggested that property
seizures intrude on a suspect's liberty interests because property cannot move independently
of its owner. Comment, supra note 18, at 645. Property seizures, however, need not inevitably
intrude on a suspect's liberty interests because the luggage can be moved through other
means. For example, the police could arrange for its delivery to the suspect or for its loading
into the baggage compartment of a plane.
85 103 S. Ct. at 2649 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court has never directly addressed
the propriety of concomitant property seizures. In Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326
(1983), however, the Court indicated that the police officers justifiably detained the suspect
and his luggage on reasonable suspicion. One commentator has suggested that the permissible scope of a Terry-type investigative detention may include "locating and examining objects
abandoned by the suspect." 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2, at 37 (1978).
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the same limitations on the permissible scope of an investigative detention of property as those applicable to seizures of suspects. 8 6 Therefore,
police must restrict the time and area involved in luggage seizures to the
same extent that they would for seizures of suspects.
In applying the second part of the balancing test, the Court correctly assessed the substantiality of the government interests asserted to
justify the intrusion.8 7 The narcotics problem has generated much social
unrest in the United States. It penetrates all social strata and takes its
toll in increased crime rates, lost wages, and extra demand for social
services.88 Police arrested an estimated 676,000 persons for narcotics
laws violations in 1982.89 In 1980, 3,449 drug abuse centers treated
181,500 clients at a total funding level of 486.6 million dollars. 90 Of the
20,358 inmates in federal prisons during 1981, 5,387 violated drug laws,
compared to the 4,312 serving time for robbery.9 1 United States Customs Service agents conducted 22,271 drug seizures during 1981 and
confiscated contraband worth approximately $5,236,630,000.92
Drug trafficking presents special law enforcement problems because
of the inherently transient nature of courier activity at airports. Drug
couriers can conceal their cargo relatively easily and can frequently spot
narcotics agents and avoid contact with them. They can transport the
narcotics on any one of thousands of flights leaving from several hundred airports. Although the drug courier profile 93 provides helpful
guidelines for DEA agents, it does not solve all of the problems because
86 103 S. Ct. at 2645.
87 The Court advanced its weakest argument when it analyzed the strength of the government interest. Several commentators have criticized the substantiality of the law enforcement
interest in curbing narcotics trafficking as justification for conducting searches and seizures
based on less than probable cause. While their positions have some merit, the Court has
acknowledged the use of the reasonable suspicion standard for narcotics investigations that
involve Teny-type seizures. See in/a notes 99-101 and accompanying text. It makes little
sense to prevent luggage seizures on the ground that the law enforcement interest is not sufficiently substantial when the police have the right to detain individuals reasonably suspected
of concealing drugs on their persons.
88 One court has remarked that the societal costs of the narcotics trade, "in terms of ruined and wasted lives, are staggering." United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 1977).
See general4y G. AUSTIN & D. LETTIERI, DRUGS AND CRIME, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG
ABUSE (1976); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES: 1982-83 (103d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1982) [hereinafter cited as
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES]; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAFlanagan & M. McLeod

TISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1982, (T.

eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK].
89 CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88, at 167.
90 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 88, at 124.

91 Id. at 192.
92 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 88, at 428.
93 See supra note 11.
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narcotics traffickers' behavior often approximates that of innocent
travelers.
In previous decisions, the Court has allowed limited intrusions
based on similar government interests. Officer safety, combined with the
law enforcement interest in deterring crime, justified allowing stop and
frisks on less than probable cause in Terry:
We are now concerned with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the
police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he is dealing is not armed with
a weapon that could unexpectedly and
94
fatally be used against him.

Although officer safety provided the primary justification for frisks, Justice Harlan indicated in his concurring opinion in Terry that Terry implicitly held that, apart from any concern for officer safety, the interest
in crime prevention and detection justifies seizures in the form of forci95
ble stops.
Other members of the Court have adopted Harlan's view. Justice
Stevens, writing for the Court in Michigan v. Summers,96 emphasized that
97
the need to investigate criminal activity underlies Terry-type seizures.
In Michigan v. Summers, the Court further delineated the scope of what
constitutes a substantial government interest. The Court noted three
reasons that justify the detention of an occupant while police search
premises pursuant to a valid search warrant: preventing flight should
incriminating evidence be found; minimizing the risk of harm to the
officers and occupants; and completing the authorized search in an orderly manner.9 8
In United States v. Mendenhall, three Justices indicated that curbing
94 Teny, 392 U.S. at 23.

95 Id.
Harlan's
intrusion
Spillane,

at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring). Several commentators have disagreed with
view that a generalized interest in crime prevention and detection justifies a limited
based only on reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 76, at 395;
Frisking the Fourth Amendment, 10 HUM. RTs. 22 (Spring 1982); Note, supra note 76.

96 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
97 Id. at 700 n.12. Professor LaFave has compiled a list of general "investigative tech-

niques which may be utilized effectively in the course of a T7ry-type stop." 3 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 85, at 36. These include interrogation, communication with others, and examination of premises or objects. Id. at 36-37.
98 452 U.S. at 702-03. In Summers, however, the Court emphasized:
Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent's house for contraband. A neutral and detached
magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated ....
The detention of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself.
Id. at 701. Because the intrusion was so slight compared to that caused by the search, the
Court readily accepted more generalized law enforcement interests as justification for the
detention. In Place, however, the government made no showing of probable cause. United
States v. Place, 660 F.2d at 49.
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narcotics trafficking justified a Terry-type seizure. 9 9 The plurality in
Florida v. Royer' 0 0 suggested that nothing in the Terry rationale prevents
temporary detentions for questioning on reasonable suspicion where the
government interest entails the suppression of illegal transactions in
drugs or of any serious crime.a0
The government interest in preventing the illegal entry of aliens
into the United States justified temporary stops of travelers on reasonable suspicion near the Mexican border in United States v. BrignoniPonce.102 The Court remarked:
The Government makes a convincing demonstration that the public
interest demands effective measures to prevent the illegal entry of aliens
... . [T]hese aliens create significant economic and social problems,
competing with citizens and legal 3resident aliens for jobs, and generating
extra demand for social services.10
The Brignoni-Ponce Court indicated that the difficulty in patrolling the
long Mexican border also justifed the limited intrusion involved in these
04
investigatory stops.
The government interests asserted to justify the investigatory detention in Place mirror the substantial law enforcement concerns recognized
by the Court in past cases. Therefore, the Court justifiably allowed
these interests to override the minimal intrusion on a suspect's fourth
amendment interests resulting from seizure of personal effects.
B.

"CANINE SNIFFS" AS SEARCHES

The Supreme Court did not need to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the "canine sniff" of Place's luggage because the Court could
have reversed Place's conviction on the grounds that the ninety-minute
luggage detention violated his fourth amendment rights and thereby
tainted the cocaine confiscated as a result of the seizure.10 5 Thus, Justices Brennan and Blackmun correctly criticized the Court for unneces06
sarily deciding a constitutional question.'
The Court's lack of information greatly hindered its ability to deal
99 446 U.S. 544, 560 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
100 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (plurality opinion).
101 Id. at 1324. The Court later noted that Royer's behavior provided "adequate grounds
for suspecting Royer of carrying drugs and for temporarily detaining him and his luggage
while they attempted to verify or dispel their suspicions in a manner that did not exceed the
limits of an investigative detention." Id. at 1326.
102 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
103 Id. at 878-79; see supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
104 Id.; see supra note
105 See sufra note 20.

93 and accompanying text.

106 103 S.Ct. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see
supra note 58; see a/so Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147 n.2 (1970) (Supreme
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adequately with the complexities of the "canine sniff" issue, 0 7 a topic
that has divided the lower courts. 10 8 Although several arguments support the view that "dog sniffs" of luggage do not constitute searches, an
equally strong case exists for the theory that "dog sniffs" are searches
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 0 9
Court ordinarily does not decide matters neither raised before it nor considered by the court
of appeals).
Justice O'Connor believed, however, that the Court needed to decide the "canine sniff"
issue to resolve fully the luggage seizure issue. She suggested that if "dog sniffs" were searches
requiring probable cause, reasonable suspicion could never justify the initial seizure of a suspect's luggage in order to perform a sniff test. 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
Even if police were required to have probable cause to justify a "canine sniff," police
could conduct luggage seizures based upon reasonable suspicion. In the past, the Court has
established different requirements for various types of police behavior. See, e.g., Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (police may seize luggage believed to contain contraband without a warrant, but subsequent search requires warrant); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) (officer may question suspects about their citizenship and immigration status and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances based only on reasonable suspicion, but any further detention or search must be based on probable cause). The Court
analyzes the constitutionality of each component of police behavior independently and according to the standards established for each.
107 103 S.Ct. at 2651 (Brennan, J., concurring).
108 Several courts have held that "canine sniffs" are not searches within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. See, e.g. United States v. Waltzer, 682 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 3543 (1983); United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 962 (1981); United States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 26 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 13 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); United States v.
Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 101 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976);
United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
The Ninth Circuit modified Solis in United States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. granted,judgment vacated andremanded, 103 S.Ct. 3529 (1983) (remanded for consideration in light of Place), holding that a "dog sniff" is an invasion requiring reasonable suspicion. Discussing alternative means to investigate the contents of a suspect's luggage, the
Supreme Court noted in Royer that "no Court of Appeals has held that more than an articulable suspicion is necessary to justify this kind of a warrantless search if indeed it is a search."
103 S. Ct. at 1328 n.10.
Courts have been more exacting in the context of "canine sniffs" of persons. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 462 (2d Cir. 1975) (intrusion more restricted because "dog sniff" directed at luggage instead of person), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976); id. at
465 (Mansfield, J., concurring) ("canine sniff" of person would have been unreasonable under
the facts of the case); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980)
("dragnet" sniffs of schoolchildren an unreasonable search). But see Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F.
Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (dragnet dog sniffs of persons not a search), aj'd in part, remanded
inpart, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981). Dissenting
from the denial of certiorari in Doe v. Renfrow, Justice Brennan argued that "dog sniffs" of
persons are searches but that sniffs of inanimate objects might present a different situation.
451 U.S. at 1025-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
109 Several commentators have addressed the constitutionality of "canine sniffs." See, e.g., 1
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(0 (1978); Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the
Right to friva."Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA.L. REv. 75 (1976); Note, Constitutional
Limitations on the Use of Canines to Detect Evidence of Crime, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 973 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Note, ConstitutionalLimitations]; Comment, United States v. Solis: Have the
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In essence, a search is a government intrusion that violates a person's reasonable expectations of privacy."10 Various characteristics of
"canine sniffs" lend support to the Court's view that no search occurs
when police administer sniff tests of luggage in a public place."1 ' The
Court noted that "dog sniffs" do not require that police open luggage,
thereby exposing constitutionally protected noncontraband items to
public scrutiny.'" 2 "Canine sniffs" of luggage differ from magnetometer
screenings, which have been held to constitute searches primarily because they are directed toward persons and reveal the presence of any
metal, whether illegal or not. Police direct "dog sniffs" like the one in
3
Place toward inanimate objects, not people."1
"Canine sniffs" also do not intrude on an innocent person's privacy
interests in the luggage contents because "canine sniffs" reveal only the
presence or absence of narcotics. Any error in detection resulting from a
camouflaged scent "favors the suspect and precludes search and subsequent arrest.""t 4 Moreover, concealed drugs emit odors, and "what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."' 15 Finally, courts
Covernment's SupersnIffers Come Down With a Caseof ConstitutionalNasal Congestion?, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 410 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, United States v. Solis]; Note, Search and
Seizure: The Detection of Maa'uanaby Trained Dogs-United States v. Bronstein, 521 F2d 459
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96S. C. 1121 (1976), 2 U. DAYTON L. REv. 149 (1977). These
commentators generally agree that "dog sniffs" entail at least some degree of intrusion into a
suspect's fourth amendment rights.
110 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (bugging of a telephone booth constituted an impermissible warrantless search, even though probable cause existed). Prior to
Katz, fourth amendment protection depended upon whether the police physically invaded an
area in which the defendant had a right to privacy and seized a tangible object. See, e.g.,
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The Katz Court rejected Olastead's "constitutionally protected areas" doctrine in favor of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-53.
t11 Relying on their unparalleled nature as an investigative method, Justice O'Connor
characterized "canine sniffs" as "sui generis." 103 S. Ct. at 2644; see also Note, Constitutional
Limitations, supra note 109, at 985-88.
t12 103 S. Ct. at 2644.
"13 See, e.g., Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 462-63 (distinguishing United States v. Albarado, 495
F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974) (magnetometer scanning of persons held search) on the grounds that
searches of persons intrude into intimate areas in which greater expectations of privacy exist).
1"4 Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 463. But see Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1980)
(dog repeatedly "alerted" to schoolchild, but no drugs were found during subsequent body
searches),afdinparl,remandedinpart,631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam),cert denied, 451
U.S. 1022 (1981).
115 Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 462 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))
("plain view" doctrine). The Bronstein court continued:
If the police officers here had detected the aroma of the drug through their own olfactory
senses, there could be no serious contention that their sniffing in the area of the bags
would be tantamount to an unlawful search. ...
We fail to understand how the detection of the odoriferous drug by the use of the
sensitive and schooled canine senses here employed alters the situation and renders the
police procedure constitutionally suspect.
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have held that the use of sense-enhancing devices in such "plain
16
view/smell" situations do not constitute searches.'
Although "canine sniffs" obtain only limited information, valid arguments exist that refute some of the reasons propounded in support of
the Court's holding in Place. "Canine sniffs" do not intrude on innocent
travelers' privacy interests in their luggage only to the extent that the
dogs are well-trained and accurate, and that any errors tend toward
nondetection. In addition, a "plain view/smell" doctrine cannot apply
because police officers usually will not be able to detect the presence of
narcotics under any conditions without using trained dogs.' 17 Moreover, "canine sniffs" replace rather than enhance an officer's senses.
Judge Mansfield, concurring in United States v. Bronstein, argued that a
dog's sensitive nose replaces a police officer's senses in the same manner
that hidden microphones replace an officer's hearing in areas where the
sounds are otherwise inaudible. Comparing "canine sniffs" and magnetometers, Justice Mansfield noted that
Neither constitutes a particularly offensive intrusion, such as ransacking
the contents of the hidden space, or exposing a person to indignities in the
case of a personal search. But the fact remains that each detects hidden
objects without actual entry and without the enhancement of human
senses. The fact that the canine's search is more particularized and discriminate than that of the magnetometer is not a basis for a legal
distinction. 181
Therefore, any attempt to hold that "canine sniffs" do not constitute
searches falls short of being completely persuasive.
If the Court wanted to resolve the issue, it could have applied Terry
standards and held "dog sniffs" to be searches that are justifiable on the
basis of reasonable suspicion 1 9 rather than adopting an inflexible "all
or nothing" standard to analyze the constitutionality of "canine
sniffs."' 20 Because a "canine sniff' does not approximate a full-scale
search in that it does not entail wholesale disclosure of the luggage's
Id. at 461. The court in United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976) emphasized
that the "dog sniff" consisted merely of a "monitoring of the air in an area open to the
public."
116 See, e.g., Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 462 ("canine sniffs" might enhance, but do not replace
the officer's senses); United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 852
(1974) (use of flashlight not a search).
117 Comment, United States v. Solis, supra note 109, at 423; see also Note, Constitutional
Limitations, supra note 109, at 988-89.
118 Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 464 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
119 Justice Blackmun suggested in Place that Teny principles might apply to "canine
sniffs." 103 S.Ct. at 2653 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Court can only apply the balancing test if Teny applies to searches of property as well as seizures.
120 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (suggesting that a rigid all-or-nothing model of
justification and regulation under the fourth amendment restricts the utility of limitations
upon the initiation and scope of police action).
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contents, courts could validly apply the Terry balancing test. A "dog
sniff" involves a relatively limited intrusion on a suspect's fourth amendment interests. The strong government interest in detecting illegal narcotics trafficking could justify conducting "canine sniffs" based upon
21
reasonable suspicion.'
In holding that "canine sniffs" do not constitute searches, the Court
retreated markedly from progressive constitutional interpretation. It returned to the pre-Teny method of validating government intrusions
based on less than probable cause by finding that no fourth amendment
interests were implicated. The Court has removed "canine sniffs" of
luggage in factual situations similar to Place from both the scope of the
fourth amendment and the watchful eye of judicial scrutiny. Because it
was not adequately informed about "canine sniffs," the Court should
have refrained from taking such drastic action.
C.

IMPACT OF PLACE

Although the Court's decision extends the Tery doctrine to seizures
of property, it probably will impact very little on current police practices when a suspect has custody of the luggage. Police officers most
likely will only detain suitcases incidental to the primary seizure of the
suspect for three reasons. First, individuals, rather than their luggage,
usually provide the strongest grounds for establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.1 22 Second, police officers prefer to have the
suspect available should they discover contraband and desire to make
an arrest. Third, because the Court imposed the same time 123 and
area1 24 restrictions on seizures of luggage directly from a suspect's control that apply to investigative detentions of the person, police officers
do not have any special incentive to seize luggage independently of the
suspect. Because police may only permissibly detain luggage as long as
121 See supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text; see also 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 109, at

288.
122 Of the 15 characteristics on which the police officers in Miami and New York based
their suspicions, only two directly related to the luggage. United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp.
at 1224-26; see supra notes 7 & 11.
123 103 S. Ct. at 2645-46. The ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 110.2(1) (1975) recommends that police detain an individual for a maximum of 20 minutes
during a Teny-type investigative stop.
124 Although the Court never directly indicated that the removal of Place's luggage to
Kennedy Airport rendered the seizure unreasonable, it did suggest that had the police
brought the dog to LaGuardia, such "conduct also would have avoided the further substantial
intrusion on respondent's possessory interests caused by the removal of his luggage to another
location." 103 S. Ct. at 2646 n.9 (emphasis added). Even if police could move the luggage to
another location, the time limitations restrict their ability to transport the suitcases more than
a short distance.
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they may constitutionally detain suspects, officers gain no advantages by
allowing the suspects to leave.
The Court's decision, however, provides little guidance concerning
how to apply the Terry exception to luggage seizures when the suspect
does not have custody or control of the luggage. Courts might analogize
such seizures to UnitedStates v. Van Leeuwen 125 and validate lengthier detentions on the grounds that they are less intrusive on fourth amendment interests than seizures from a suspect's custody. Such detentions
do not intrude directly on suspects' possessory interests in their luggage. 126 Also, because suspects will not know that their luggage has
been seized, they will not feel compelled to remain with it; thus, seizures
do not intrude on suspects' liberty interests.
The Court should be extremely careful when it finally addresses
this issue. If given too much freedom by the Court, police will have
added incentive to seize luggage from the baggage racks. Although not
intrinsically detrimental, extended detentions might cause great inconvenience for suspects. For example, should the investigation prove futile, police might not be able to return the luggage by the time suspects
arrive to claim it.
The "canine sniff" decision also raises many questions that the
Court failed to consider. Since the Court held that "canine sniffs" of
luggage in a public place are not searches, sniffs of baggage pickup areas
are not subject to constitutional scrutiny because no search or seizure
occurs. Isolated or blanket investigations utilizing "dog sniffs" without
any objective grounds for suspicion might also be immune from judicial
scrutiny.12 7 In addition, the Court left unresolved the issue of whether a
"4canine sniff" of a person in a public place constitutes a search.128
The use of dogs to sniff luggage for narcotics raises the question of
125 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (detention of mail after suspect
relinquished control); see supra note 16.
126 One commentator has noted that "Van Leeuwen was an easy case for the Court because

the defendant was unable to show that the invasion intruded upon either a privacy interest in
the contents of the packages or a possessory interest in the packages themselves." 3 W.
LAFAV E, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.6(e), at 71 (Supp. 1983).

The Court should be wary of applying Van Leeuwen in such circumstances. In Van
Leeuwen, the defendant had relinquished control of mail to the postal authorities. Courts
have applied Van Leeuwen's reasonableness standard almost exclusively in the mail context.
Comment, Demise of the Probable Cause Requirement in Seizures of Inanimate Objects-UnitedStates
v. Place and United States v. Martell, 51 U. CIN. L. REv. 405, 414 n.64 (1982). Second, the
Supreme Court limited its holding in Van Leeuwen to the facts of that case, and only cited it
twice before Place, neither time for its holding. See Comment, supra note 18, at 640 & n.46.
127 Blanket investigations would run counter to the opinions of many lower courts that
have indicated that their decisions would have been different had the "canine sniff" been part
of a dragnet-type operation. See, e.g., Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 462.
128 Justice Brennan has expressed his belief that "dog sniffs" of people constitute searches.
Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1025-26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
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what may be admitted into evidence at trial. A dog may "alert" law
enforcement officers to a suitcase that contains a gun in addition to (or
possibly instead of) drugs. Whether prosecutors will be able to introduce such ancillary evidence will most likely be a topic of intense debate
during the next few years.' 2 9 Because luggage will only be subject to full
searches if a dog establishes probable cause by "alerting" to the apparent presence of drugs, police will not be able to utilize "canine sniffs" to
discover evidence of crime in general. Therefore, the Court should permit the receipt of ancillary evidence since police will rarely discover it
independently of discovering narcotics.
The Court should limit the applicability of the Place holding in its
future decisions. The severe narcotics problem provides sufficient
grounds for a seizure and properly limited investigative detention of luggage based only on reasonable suspicion. 3 0° Although critics have questioned the substantiality of the government interest in curbing narcotics
trafficking as justification for such intrusions on a suspect's fourth
amendment interests,' 3' it makes no sense to prevent luggage seizures
when police officers have the right to detain individuals suspected of
transporting narcotics on their persons.
The Court must be careful to avoid approving carte blanche luggage
seizures for any and all law enforcement interests. Such treatment of
the Place extension of the Teny doctrine would further emasculate the
probable cause requirement in cases of limited intrusions on a suspect's
fourth amendment interests. 3 2 The Te ry doctrine, whether in the context of searches and seizures of persons or property, should remain a
stringently applied exception to the probable cause requirement.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's holdings in Place that law enforcement authorities may conduct limited seizures of luggage based upon reasonable
suspicion and that "canine sniffs" of luggage located in a public place
rari). Lower courts have also expressed a desire to place greater restrictions on "canine sniffs"

of persons. See, e.g., Bronstein, 521 F.2d at 462; see supra note 108.
129 Several commentators addressed the same concern after the Supreme Court decided
Teny. See, e.g., LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Bey'ond, 67 MICH. L. REv. 40,88 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1967 Terr, 82 HARV. L. REv. 93, 186
(1968); Case Comment, CriminalProcedure: FriskPemissible Where ReasonableSuspicion ofCriminal
Activil Exists, 53 MINN. L. REv. 652 (1969).
13o Although the specific issue of what constitutes reasonable suspicion was outside the
scope of the Court's decision, its importance cannot be minimized. The full impact of the
holding in Place depends partly upon the standards required to justify reasonable suspicion.
131 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 79; Comment, ReformulatingSeicures, supra note 75.
132 Contra LaFave, supra note 129, at 55 n.82 (justification should match the degree of
intrusion).
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are not searches touched upon two areas of search and seizure doctrine
never before addressed by the Court. Although general constitutional
principles and precedent support the luggage seizure decision, the Court
should have refrained from considering the "canine sniff" issue. Apart
from the merits of these holdings, however, the Court's willingness to
address issues unnecessary to the resolution of the case demonstrates its
desire to revamp fourth amendment doctrine in the face of law enforcement's inability to curb rising crime rates.
LINDA M.
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